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Military Activity in the Levantine Sea (Republic of Cyprus v Turkey)
On the night of the 30th of October 2020, at 09.07 PM, the Turkish Naval Forces were detected sailing in the vicinity of the Famagusta area, close to the coastline of the Republic of Cyprus. On board of the vessel was a brand-new armed radar system, which the Turkish forces seemed to be using in order to track airspace movements above the Levantine Sea (the easternmost part of the Mediterranean Sea) and detect possible threats in the area close by.
The armed radar system is usually employed for temporary interference with communication networks. Though the radar system is mainly used for defensive purposes, occasionally it could have offensive objectives as well. This armed system has a small radius of only 10 kilometers. Using such a system in the Famagusta area would mean a temporary loss of any kind of communication signals used by the coastal guard in the area, including all communication with vessels.
When the Naval vessel sailed into the territorial zone, approximately three nautical miles from the baseline [1], the Cypriot guards noticed the light of the naval vessel and could distinguish the outline of the radar device.
At 11.13PM, as the vessel was advancing towards the beach of Varosha city, it was blocked by a Cypriot underwater specialized defense device, specifically an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). The impact caused serious damages to the bow of the Turkish vessel, as well as serious injuries to a part of the military crew, including the Lieutenant Commander Cetin, and the Vice-Admiral Emir. Once the naval vessel was seized, Cypriot military forces noted that the radar system had a component to launch small rockets in the area. The Turkish Naval personnel claimed that the installed system was not meant to be used in the area of Varosha city. They explained it was meant to secure the safety of the area in relation to maritime drilling, and accordingly used for the scope of conducting routine operations.
For the duration of approximately an hour in the timeframe between the initial detection of the Turkish vessel and its interception, the radar system has caused major interference with the signal in the coastal area. As such, Cypriot coastal guards were not able to communicate with any of the central organs. This constitutes, from Cyprus’ perspective a serious attempt to create a national security breach.
Further details to be disclosed in the Study Guide.
Cyprus argues that:
Turkey argues that:
[1] An (international) nautical mile (NM of NML) is equal to 1852 meters.
The armed radar system is usually employed for temporary interference with communication networks. Though the radar system is mainly used for defensive purposes, occasionally it could have offensive objectives as well. This armed system has a small radius of only 10 kilometers. Using such a system in the Famagusta area would mean a temporary loss of any kind of communication signals used by the coastal guard in the area, including all communication with vessels.
When the Naval vessel sailed into the territorial zone, approximately three nautical miles from the baseline [1], the Cypriot guards noticed the light of the naval vessel and could distinguish the outline of the radar device.
At 11.13PM, as the vessel was advancing towards the beach of Varosha city, it was blocked by a Cypriot underwater specialized defense device, specifically an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). The impact caused serious damages to the bow of the Turkish vessel, as well as serious injuries to a part of the military crew, including the Lieutenant Commander Cetin, and the Vice-Admiral Emir. Once the naval vessel was seized, Cypriot military forces noted that the radar system had a component to launch small rockets in the area. The Turkish Naval personnel claimed that the installed system was not meant to be used in the area of Varosha city. They explained it was meant to secure the safety of the area in relation to maritime drilling, and accordingly used for the scope of conducting routine operations.
For the duration of approximately an hour in the timeframe between the initial detection of the Turkish vessel and its interception, the radar system has caused major interference with the signal in the coastal area. As such, Cypriot coastal guards were not able to communicate with any of the central organs. This constitutes, from Cyprus’ perspective a serious attempt to create a national security breach.
Further details to be disclosed in the Study Guide.
Cyprus argues that:
- Turkish military mission was a serious violation of their territorial sovereignty, because the radar system on board of the vessel seems to be used for launching small rockets in the coastal area of Famagusta, and it seriously interfered with essential communication networks.
- The blockage of the Turkish vessel was justified under Art. 51 of the UN Charter as a legitimate act of self-defense considering the serious interference with the communication signal in the area.
Turkey argues that:
- The seizure of their Naval Vessel was unlawful under the Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which ensures the right of innocent passage of foreign ships in the Territorial sea.
- The radar device had no military purpose but was intended to use of civil targets and does not constitute evidence as to Turkey’s intention to install a defense system in the area
[1] An (international) nautical mile (NM of NML) is equal to 1852 meters.